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Dawn Following Darkness: An Outcome -Oriented
Model for Corporate Governance
Martin B. Robins*
"'The time has come,' the Walrus said, to talk of many things: of shoes-and ships-and
sealing wax. ."The Walrus and the Carpenter, Lewis Carroll, 1872
'The old ways that led to this crisis cannot stand. And to the extent that some have so read-
ily returned to them underscores the need for change and change now. History can not be
allowed to repeat itself." President Barack Obama, 2009
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I. INTRODUCTION
Both the President and the Walrus are correct in their own
ways; in order to change the old ways which led to our current
economic crisis, we must now talk of many things that for many
years have seemed unthinkable. Among them are some long-
standing principles of corporate law and governance. We must
seek improvement in corporate governance so that large, systemi-
cally important firms do not become involved in the predicaments
which precipitated the economic downturn and necessitated huge
government bailouts to minimize the broader economic fallout.'
* Comments are eagerly solicited and should be addressed to the author at
mrobmns@mr-laws.com. Mr. Robins is a private practitioner in Buffalo Grove, IL with a
corporate transactional practice emphasizing technology and intellectual property matters,
as well as an adjunct professor at Northwestern University School of Law and DePaul
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This article advocates imposition of some explicit sanction on
boards of directors of very large firms in certain circumstances
where their firms have suffered seriously adverse financial out-
comes, irrespective of whether "proper" process was followed.
President Obama correctly explains the need for societal con-
cern when he states, "[T]here are some in the financial industry
who are misreading this moment. Instead of learning the lessons
of Lehman and the crisis from which we are still recovering, they
are choosing to ignore them. They do so not just at their own
peril, but at our nation's."2 Corporate governance is relevant be-
cause there is general agreement that these recent debacles re-
sulted from simple ineptitude or dishonesty-reckless or non-
existent loan underwriting, irresponsible borrowing, overly com-
plicated securitization or misleading accounting-and not from
aggressive, innovative conduct of business.3
University College of Law. He holds a B.S. Econ. (summa cum laude) from the Wharton
School of the University of Pennsylvania and a J.D. (cum laude) from Harvard Law School.
He wishes to acknowledge the excellent input and research assistance of Gayle A. Jackson,
Esq. and excellent input of June L. Robins.
1. Lehman Brothers, Wachovia, Washington Mutual, Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae, and
AIG. "A year ago, the collapse of Lehman Brothers set off a series of stunning events from
which Wall Street is still recovering." The Crisis: A Timeline, A shocking series of events
that forever changed the financial markets, CNN MONEY, Sept., 14 2009,
http://money.cnn.com/galleries/2008/news/0809/gallery.weekthat broke-wall-street/index.
html [hereinafter Crisis]. A separate article on the same website indicates that the AIG
bailout alone cost the government $116 billion and the Troubled Asset Recovery Program
cost approximately $372 billion with $90 billion of that going to Citigroup and Bank of
America alone. David Goldman, One year later: Have the bailouts worked?, CNN MONEY,
http://www.mutualfundsmag.us/news/storysupplementeconomy/bailout_matrix (last visted
Feb. 4, 2010). Significant amounts of TARP funds have been repaid as of early 2010. See,
e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, 10 Banks Allowed to Repay $68B in Bailout Money, WASH.
POST, June 10, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/06/09/AR2009060900891.html; Donald Marron, TARP Repayments
Reach $164 Billion, WALL ST. PIT, December 23, 2009, http://wallstreetpit.com/13153-tarp-
repayments-reach-164-billion. Yet another article enumerates some of the asset write
downs attributable to the events of late 2008 and refers to $29 billion with respect to Wash-
ington Mutual, $56 billion with respect to Wachovia and $40 billion with respect to Coun-
trywide Financial. Peter Eavis, Silent Treatment on Bank Write-Downs, WALL ST. J., Sept.
21, 2009, at C10. Of course, this is in addition to the double digit unemployment plaguing
the country in the wake of the financial collapses. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS DATA, Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey (2009),
http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/servlet/SurveyOutputServlet?data-tool=latestnumbers&series-id
=LNS14000000 (reporting unemployment at 10.0% in December 2009).
2. Crisis, supra note 1.
3. "[T]he financial crisis was caused by the meltdown of almost 25 million subprime
and other nonprime mortgages-almost half of all U.S. mortgages . . . ." Peter J. Wallison,
Barney Frank, Predatory Lender, WALL ST. J., October 16, 2009, at A19. In earlier cases
which also illustrated the need for improved governance, several large companies, such as
Enron, WorldCom, and Health South were brought down by outright fraud perpetrated by
their managements. See MARK JICKLING, ACCOUNTING REFORM AFTER ENRON: ISSUES IN
THE 108m CONGRESS 1 (2003),
Winter 2010Corporate Governance 3
The objective of efforts to improve corporate governance must be
the improvement of business decision-making in order to avoid the
sort of catastrophic decisions that brought down and required
bailouts of so many giant firms during 2008. By definition, this
means that improvement of outcomes must be the ultimate objec-
tive of these efforts.
However, both present law and the most prominent of pending
reform efforts have little to do with outcomes per se and much to
do with processes which are deemed to impact outcomes. As will
be discussed below, there is no legal accountability for anyone as a
result of even disastrously poor corporate performance, so long as
decision-makers utilized appropriate process and made appropri-
ate disclosures. While there are numerous pending efforts to im-
prove the situation, all of them are intended either to "deal with"
public company executive pay practices which are quite confi-
dently said by many knowledgeable observers, such as Federal
Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke and renowned Princeton
professor of economics Alan Blinder, to cause the overly risky be-
havior which resulted in disaster,4 or to affect the composition of
boards of directors of public companies in an effort to allow dissi-
dent shareholders to replace directors who have not performed
effectively.5
No less august a body than the G20 Finance Ministers and Cen-
tral Bank Governors reflect this orientation on the part of policy-
makers. In their September 5, 2009 Banking Statement, they
propose a "framework on corporate governance and compensation
practices" in an effort to "prevent excessive short term risk taking
and mitigate systemic risk." Among the major steps they suggest
are: "greater disclosure and transparency of the level and struc-
ture of remuneration for those whose actions have a material im-
pact on risk taking"; "global standards on pay structure, including
on deferral, effective clawback, the relationship between fixed and
https://www.pohicyarchive.org/bitstream/handle/10207/3741/RS21530-20030528.pdf?sequen
cel1.
4. See Alan Blinder, Crazy Compensation and the Crisis, Wall St. J., May 28, 2009, at
A15. See also infra notes 12, 56. Even President Obama, in what appears to be a form
letter sent to the author and others who have addressed this topic, speaks in the same
sentence of "outrageous bonuses" and "risky transactions" but says little about the need for
better decision-making on the merits of business issues. Letter from Barack Obama to
Author (August 21, 2009) (on file with author). To this end through the Treasury Depart-
ment, he is supporting legislation to give shareholders a "say on pay." See infra notes 60-63
and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text; Sarah N. Lynch, Activists Take Note:
SEC Delays a Proxy Vote, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2009, at B3.
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variable remuneration and guaranteed bonuses, to ensure com-
pensation practices are aligned with long-term value creation and
financial stability" and "corporate governance reforms to ensure
appropriate board oversight of compensation and risk, including
greater independence and accountability of board compensation
committees."6
When commenting on the difficulty of finding a viable business
model for fallen insurance giant MlG, one commentator critiqued
these sentiments when he stated, "Deploring high CEO pay is so
much more fun than grasping this difficult nettle. It's also not a
real solution."7 An illustration of how rhetoric is being substituted
for substantive improvement is found in the response of one re-
nowned corporate governance expert to the decision by federal
pay czar" Kenneth Feinberg to cut cash compensation for execu-
tives of the firms, which required ongoing government bailouts:
This backward-looking strategy seems intuitive to any parent
raising a child, or any pet owner trying to train a puppy. You
wait until the child or puppy does something wrong (or right)
and then respond with a punishment (or reward). The focus
is on past behavior and leaves ample room for discretion. 8
With all due respect to Prof. Stout, this author favors ex ante
direction and assignment of responsibility, aimed at avoidance of
"bad behavior" over ex post sanctions once it occurs. 9
This author's belief is that executive pay is irrelevant as a socie-
tal matter in itself and that the quality of executive decision-
making is what must be addressed. Similarly, it is his belief that
the composition of boards is equally irrelevant, but that their per-
formance in vetting management decisions and integrity is very
relevant. As a corollary to the preceding observations, the author
believes that public policy should and must address corporate gov-
ernance improvement only in those situations where its inade-
quacy can impact those outside the corporation. In such situa-
tions, it is preferable (and possible) to directly influence outcomes
6. 020 statement on strengthening the financial system, REUTERS, Sept. 5, 2009,
http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=UL566412820090905.
7. Holman Jenkins, Inventing a Future for MIG, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 2009, at A13.
8. Posting of Lynn A. Stout, Paul Hastings Professor of Corporate and Securities Law
at UCLA Law School, to The Room for Debate,
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.conm/2009/10/22/the-fallout-from-big-pay-cuts (Oct. 22,
2009).
9. In general, a puppy's misbehavior will have less of a macroeconomic effect than a
public company board's misbehavior.
36 Vol. 48
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instead of the processes which may impact them. This article is
intended to explain why the emphasis on process is often mis-
placed, why the current legal environment is not conducive to the
steps which he believes will bring about better outcomes, but
tends to cause undue attention to process, and proposes certain
changes which he anticipates will have this effect.
Il. WHAT CAUSES BAD DECISIONS By EXECUTIVES?
The current "conventional wisdom" is that compensation formu-
lae directly encourage and are the principal contributor to overly
risky behavior,' 0 and that boards of directors are so entrenched
and insulated from risk of loss of their seats that they fail to prop-
erly monitor such behavior when it is occurring under their
noses."' Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke states that
"[c]ompensation practices at some banking organizations have led
to misaligned incentives and excessive risk-taking, contributing to
bank losses and financial instability."'12 Prof. Blinder declares:
Despite the vast outpouring of commentary and outrage over
the financial crisis, one of its most fundamental causes has
received surprisingly little attention. I refer to the perverse
incentives built into the compensation plans of many financial
firms, incentives that encourage excessive risk-taking with
OPM-Other People's Money. .. . The source of the problem
is really quite simple: give smart people go-for broke incen-
tives and they will go for broke. Duh.'3
10. Blinder, supra note 4.
11. Id. "Quite plainly, many [boards] were asleep at the switch, with disastrous conse-
quences." Id. See also Ashby Jones, With Subpoenas, Cuomo throws Himself in BacMer
Imbroglio, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2009, http:/Iblogs.wsj.com/law/2009/09/17/with-subpoenas-
cuomo-throws-himself-in-bacmer-imbroglio. New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo
when commenting on the Bank of America/Merrill Lynch transaction which led to much
controversy about bonus payments as well as a large government bailout "said he wonders
broadly where the boards were in this financial crisis and whether B of A directors 'pro-
tected the rights of shareholders, were they misled, or were they little more than rubber
stamps for management's decision-making?"' Id.
12. Jonathan Macey, Washington's Plans May Result in Even Higher Executive Pay,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 24-25, 2009, at Al15.
13. Blinder, supra note 4. See also Mark Whitehouse, Economists See Financial Crisis
Response as Risky, WALL ST. J., January 7, 2010, atA2 (quoting Stanford University econo-
mist Robert Hall on the impact of skewed incentives: "The incentives are to take a very
risky position. They get to pocket it if they win and it's the federal government's problem if
they lose.").
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However, this author's experience is that with all due respect to
Chairman Bernanke and Prof. Blinder, the matter is not as simple
as "duh" would suggest, in that poor business decision-making
results from many factors besides pay, and that after the fact, ad
hoc efforts to make executives financially accountable for bad out-
comes are not likely to prevent such outcomes in the first place.
In any event, it is far from clear that bad outcomes for one particu-
lar firm have the same societal impact as those for another. From
a societal standpoint, it is essential that we properly identify
situations where bad outcomes cannot be readily contained and
develop mechanisms to prevent such bad outcomes instead of pun-
ishing after the fact those who cause them or imposing unneeded
burdens on those who are not in a position to cause such damage.
There is no "clearinghouse" compiling the reasons for bad busi-
ness decisions. However both the author's direct experience and
observations over several decades of practicing corporate law with
clients of all sizes and in many industries in which he has ob-
served the outcomes of many good and bad decisions, as well as
writing about and teaching it, along with common sense, indicate
that bad decisions result not only from skewed monetary incen-
tives, but also from factors (alone or in combination) such as sim-
ple ineptitude, management ignorance of fact, law or market real-
ity (sometimes willful, sometimes not), hubris, inertia, megaloma-
nia, excessive emphasis on speed of implementation, and "group-
think," where faddish practices are slavishly adopted.
Additionally, there are situations-most notably Enron Corpo-
ration and Worldcom, Inc. in 2001 and 2002-where the key actors
are flatly dishonest, as opposed to being honest but having their
judgment colored by a compensation formula, and where we need
to keep such persons out of power.
The sudden collapse of Enron Corporation in late 2001, amid
revelations that its public accounting statements had been
manipulated and falsified to conceal the company's true fi-
nancial position, was the first in a series of major accounting
scandals involving American corporations . . .. The watch-
dogs meant to protect public investors-independent auditors,
boards of directors, Wall Street analysts and regulators-
were not an effective bar to corporate management bent on
38 Vol. 48
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artificial inflation of financial results. The costs of the ac-
counting scandals have been high. 14
The empirical analyses of the situation support this conclusion
with respect to overly risky decision- making. "These studies sug-
gest that bank executives were simply ignorant of the risks their
institutions were taking-not that they were deliberately courting
disaster because of their pay packages."' 5 Professor David Yer-
mack of the NYU Stern School of Business concurs in saying, "[N]o
evidence whatsoever indicates that errant executive compensation
'caused' the financial crisis of 2008."16
To the extent such circumstances are applicable, the prospect of
taking away someone's pay after the fact is not likely to prevent a
disaster in the first place. All that could prevent the disaster is to
see to it that the decision- maker(s) who are unable or unwilling to
make good decisions are kept or taken out of decision-making ca-
pacities before they can do damage. Put simply, an incompetent
person will not become more competent as a result of the threat of
recouping their pay.
The well chronicled Merrill Lynch episode is quite instructive.
In 2006, the company did enact a pay plan for top management
which embodied many, if not most, of the elements which are cur-
rently viewed as best practices, yet by its former CEO's own ad-
mission, there was no genuine understanding of the risks that it
was taking.
It sounds like something Washington's pay czar might pro-
pose to rein in runaway bonuses on Wall Street. Tie execu-
tives' compensation to their company's stock price. Withhold
big paydays for years. Claw back bonuses if things go wrong.
And force risk-loving traders to gamble with their own money,
not just their company's. In fact those strictures were part of
14. Jickling, sutpra note 3.
15. Jeffrey Friedman, Bank Pay and the Financial Crisis, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 2009,
at A21 (referring to very recent studies of the 2008 financial meltdown by Professors Rene
Stulz, Rudiger Fahlenbrach, Viral Acharya, and Matthew Richardson). Board of director
(BOD) ignorance of wrongdoing-as opposed to poor decision-making-is also emphasized
in a letter to the SEC commenting on its proposed disclosure reforms submitted by The
Ethisphere Institute through its Executive Director, Editor-in- Chief, and Managing Direc-
tor: "The Board is typically unaware of most malfeasance that occurs within an organiza-
tion. Our research indicates that commonly the board of directors is isolated from the
actual workings of a corporation's compliance and ethics function." Letter from Alexander
F. Brigham et al. to SEC (September 15, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s7l309-87.pdf.
16. David Yermack, Keeping the Pay Police at Bay, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10. 2009, at W1.
Winter 2010 9
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a compensation plan Merrill Lynch adopted voluntarily in
2006-two years before the company collapsed into the arms
of Bank of America.' 7
John Thain, who was Merrill's CEO at the time it was forced to
combine with Bank of America, stated, "There is no chance that
pretty much anybody understood what they were doing with these
securities. Creating things that you don't understand is really not
a good idea no matter who owns it."118
This is an example of something other than pay driving poor de-
cision-making and leading to a catastrophic outcome. If execu-
tives did not or could not understand the risks they were taking, it
is a non-sequitur to contend that they knowingly assumed these
risks as a result of skewed financial incentives and there is little
reason to believe that changing their compensation formulae will
lead to a different result.
III. THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK IS NOT CONDUCIVE TO
GOOD DECISION-MAKING
Current corporate and securities law does not provide proper in-
centives to avoid systemic disasters. In pertinent part, the model
for corporate governance in all U.S. jurisdictions of significance
has the following major components:' 9
17. Louise Story, In Merrill's Failed Plan, Lessons for Pay Czar, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/08/business/08pay.html? -r=l&dbk.
18. John Carney, John Thain Admits He Didn't Understand Merrill's Risks, YAHOO!
FINANCE, Oct. 7, 2009, http://finance.yahoo.com/tech-ticker/article/350268/John-Thain-
Admits-He-Didnt.
19. Corporate governance obligations are dictated by the laws of a corporation's state of
incorporation (and to some extent by the federal securities laws). In that Delaware is by
far the most influential jurisdiction for American corporate governance as a result of it
being the state of incorporation for over 50% of U.S. publicly traded companies and 63% of
the largest companies comprising the Fortune 500. See Delaware Division of Corporations,
http://corp.delaware.gov (last visited Jan. 13, 2010). This article emphasizes Delaware
authority in addition to the federal securities laws. The author is not aware of any author-
ity to the contrary of the cited Delaware cases in any other commercially significant states.
Vol. 4840
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A. Decision-making and oversight of management by a finan-
cially disinterested board of directors with "undivided loyalty"
to the firm, that is, one lacking any direct pecuniary interest in
the particular matter where the director is voting and which
requires recusal in the particular case where this is not true20
The author believes this point is self explanatory. However, the
author would also like to note that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
200221 augments this emphasis on independence with its require-
ments for detachment from management for the members of pub-
lic company audit committees.22
B. A fairly recent prescription by the Delaware Supreme Court in
its decision in the case of Smith v. Van GorkoM23 of required
processes for boards of directors (ROD) to utilize when consid-
ering major matters24 as part of their so-called "duty of care"
which complements their duty of loyalty
The Delaware court emphasized the need for directors to "in-
form themselves 'prior to making a business decision of all mate-
rial information reasonably available to them"2 5 in order to avoid a
finding of a breach of their duty of care. In finding that these par-
ticular directors had not fulfilled their obligations, the court em-
phasized the minimal amount of time devoted to consideration of
the matter in a non-emergency situation, the absence of reference
by the directors to operative documentation pertaining to the
transaction at issue, and the absence of input from legal or finan-
cial advisors.26
20. See DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 143 (West, Westlaw through 77 laws 2009); see also Loft,
Inc. v. Guth, 2 A.2d 225 (Del. Ch. 1938), cited approvingly in In re The Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 750 (Del. Ch. 2005)); cf. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458
(1928) (arguably originating this "duty of undivided loyalty" of corporate directors to their
corporations).
21. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15, 16, 28, & 29 U.S.C.).
22. See infra note 39 and accompanying text. See also Anup Agrawal & Sahiba
Chadha, Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals, 48 J. L. & EcoN. 371 (2005).
23. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. Sup. 1985).
24. Smith v. Van Gorkom has been read by the Disney Court and others as providing
guidance as to when "expert" advice-such as legal or investment banking-is required
prior to certain BOD decisions, especially those involving corporate combinations, and
strongly discouraged hasty decision-making involving major corporate transactions. Dis-
ney, 907 A.2d at 769.
25. Smith, 488 A.2d at 872.
26. Id. at 876.
Winter 2010 1
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Compounding the impact of this decision is the response of the
Delaware Legislature, which promptly enacted title 8, section
102(b)(7) of the Delaware Code to allow corporations to include in
their certificates of incorporation language "eliminating or limit-
ing the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its
stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty
[other than duty of loyalty or intentional misconduct/bad faith] as
a director."27
Delaware's Vice Chancellor has stated that "[o]ne of the primary
purposes of 102(b)(7) is to encourage directors to undertake risky,
but potentially value- maximizing, business strategies, so long as
they do so in good faith."128 While there is little reason for dis-
agreement with the Smith court's holding, its prescription should
be viewed as necessary, but not sufficient. The time has come to
reconsider this policy of simply absolving directors who properly
inform themselves of relevant information of any responsibility for
the ultimate use of such information.
In practice, one manifestation of this process orientation has
been an almost blind deference to the judgment of ratings agencies
with respect to mortgage-backed securities, notwithstanding the
common knowledge that lending standards had been so drastically
reduced. 29
C. Very strong deference by reviewing courts to the "business
judgments" of genuinely disinterested RODs based upon
proper process, notwithstanding adverse or disastrous re-
sults30
In a very recent case involving one of the firms at the epicenter
of the 2008 problems, Citigroup, the Delaware Court of Chancery
made extremely clear that pursuant to Smith, this is a corner-
stone of present law:
27. DEL CODE tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West, Westlaw through 77 laws 2009).
28. Disney, 907 A.2d at 752 (quoting Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863
A.2d 772, 777 (Del Ch. 2004) (emphasis added)). As we have unfortunately seen in In re
Citigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009) and elsewhere, this
encouragement was wildly successful.
29. Wallison, supra note 3 and infra note 76 (describing the prevailing, explicit public
policy for many years to encourage homeownership by reducing lending standards, espe-
cially for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). Despite this being the case, rating agencies did
not adjust their ratings to reflect the additional credit risk.
30. "The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . ." DEL. CODE.tit. 8, § 141(a).
This statute also applied in the Disney and Citigroup cases. See Disney, 907 A.2d at 746;
Citigro up, 964 A.2d at 120.
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[Where a BOD decision results in financial loss], director ac-
tion is analyzed under the business judgment rule, which pre-
vents judicial second guessing of the decision if the directors
employed a rational process and considered all material in-
formation reasonably available . .. . [C]ompliance with a di-
rector's duty of care can never appropriately be judicially de-
termined by reference to the content of the board decision that
leads to a corporate loss, apart from the consideration of the
good faith or rationality of the process employed. . .. Thus,
the business judgment rule is process-oriented and informed
by a deep respect for all good faith board decisions.3'
There is no doubt that this is a correct statement of present law,
but the $45 billion of government funds injected into Citigroup as
part of the 2008 TARP bailout as a result of what the court found
to be "staggering losses"3 2 indicates the dire need for change.
D. Emphasis in the federal securities laws, including the proxy
rules governing director elections,33 as well as securities issu-
ance and secondary market trading on risk disclosure instead
of substantive regulation.3 4
The major securities laws are the Securities Act of 1933,35 which
regulates initial issuance of securities to the public or in "private
placement" transactions, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,36
31. Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 122 (quoting from In re Caremark Int'l. Derivative Litig.,
698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996) (emphasis added)).
32. See supra note 1 and accompanying text; Citigro up, 964 A.2d at 139.
33. See infra note 40.
34. The federal securities laws have been described as "rotten egg" statutes, meaning
that one can sell all of the rotten securities they want, so long as they clearly disclose how
rotten they are. "[The Securities Act of 1933] has sometimes been called 'the rotten egg'
statute because its theory is that it is perfectly alright to sell rotten eggs to the public as
long as you say clearly that they are rotten-and perhaps tell why and how they became
rotten..."A.A. Sommer, Jr., SEC Commissioner reprinted in SEC Annual Rpt. 1973 at 1-
2 available at
http://c04O3731.cdn.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/collection/papers/1970/1973_1024_Somm
erAnnualReports.pdf. The forms for companies to use for securities offerings and periodic
disclosures expressly require and cause extensive discussion of "risk factors" pertaining to
their businesses. 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c) (2009). Item 503 of Regulation S-K which is in-
corporated into many of the forms used in connection with securities offerings under the
Securities Act of 1933, requires disclosure and discussion of the "most significant factors
that make the offering speculative or risky" including "Your lack of an operating history"
and "Your lack of profitable operations in recent periods." Id.
35. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-
77aa (2006)).
36. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-77oo (2006)).
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which in pertinent part regulates trading in already-issued securi-
ties and the obligations of public companies with respect to peri-
odic financial reporting and shareholder votes, and the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, which sought to respond to the fraudulent pub-
lic company behavior which became evident in 2000 and 2001 by
imposing additional responsibility on officers and directors and
essentially remaking the public accounting profession. 37
The SEC's official website describes the purposes of the major
Acts as follows:
Often referred to as the 'truth in securities' law, the Securities
Act of 1933 has two basic objectives:
* require that investors receive financial and other significant
information concerning securities being offered for public sale;
and
* prohibit deceit, misrepresentations and other fraud in the
sale of securities ...
The [Securities Exchange Act of 1934] empowers the SEC to
require periodic reporting of information by companies with
publicly traded securities.
The [Act] also governs the disclosure in materials used to so-
licit shareholders' votes in annual or special meetings held for
the election of directors and the approval of other corporate
action ....38
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which was characterized by
former President Bush as "the most far reaching reform of Ameri-
can business practices since the time of Franklin Delano Roose-
velt," is described by the SEC only as "[m]andat[ing] a number of
reforms to enhance corporate responsibility, enhance financial
37. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, & 29 U.S.C.). Other federal statutes govern
various securities related matters, such as mutual fund and investment advisor operation,
but are not germane to general corporate governance issues.
38. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, The Laws That Govern the Securities
Industry, http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Jan. 13, 2010).
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disclosures and combat corporate and accounting fraud and
creat[ing] the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board." 39
The principal regulation governing proxy disclosure with re-
spect to director elections, Exchange Act Schedule 14A,40 provides
for disclosure of intricate detail as to officer and director compen-
sation (base and incentive), security holdings (direct, option and
restricted), retirement benefits (qualified and non-qualified), per-
quisites such as company-provided home security, financial plan-
ning, club memberships, vehicles and aircraft use and some com-
parison of company performance to those in its industry "peer
group." However, it is far from clear that any of this provides any
substantial insight into the nature or quality of anyone's business
decision- making.
E. Emphasis by reviewing courts and commentators on director
conduct regarding merger and acquisition and other major
corporate transactions, instead of operating decisions in the
"ordinary course of business"41
There is extensive jurisprudence around the duties of boards
when their firm is "in play." In the wake of Smith, the Delaware
courts developed intricate rules governing what their duty of care
dictates directors may, must and must not do to avoid a hostile
takeover, 42 when some change of control is inevitable,43 maximize
39. Id. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted in 2002 in response to major corporate
scandals early in the last decade-such as Enron, WorldCom and Adelphia--indicating
major weaknesses in governance allowing the existence of outright fraud in financial re-
porting, has a decided emphasis on compensation, disclosure, and procedure with its major
provisions requiring additional officer and director signatures on securities law filings, 15
U.S.C. § 7241, documentation of internal controls, 15 U.S.C. § 7262, additional regulation of
the public accounting profession and separation of accounting firm auditing and consulting
activities, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7212, 7231, allowing recapture of executive pay in the event of cer-
tain earnings restatements, 15 U.S.C. § 7242, and prohibitions on corporate loans to their
own executives, 15 U.S.C. § 78m. wAhile all of this may be desirable in its own right, it does
not attempt to directly influence decision- making, and clearly has not lead to a vast im-
provement in outcomes. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to a case addressing
the constitutionality of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. Free Enterprise
Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. cir. 2008), cert.
granted, 129 S. ct. 2378 (2009) (No. 08-861).
40. 17 c.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (2009). As this article goes to press in February 2010, new
SEC rules intended to enhance the value of existing disclosure of management compensa-
tion by elaborating on the value of stock option grants were taking effect. Floyd Norris, A
Window Opens on Pay for Bosses, N.Y. TIMES, January 15, 2010, at B1. These changes are
also discussed in the Release, infra note 69.
41. Stephen J. Lubben & Alana J. Darnell, Delaware's Duty of Care, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L.
589 (2006).
42. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
43. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
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the price to shareholders,"4 and structure a change of control
agreement to permit the making of higher bids.45 Additionally,
there is a separate federal statute known as the Williams Act 46
which also addresses proper conduct by issuers and security hold-
ers in connection with public offers to purchase securities, usually
in efforts to take over or take private companies, known as "tender
offers." While all of these obligations make sense in the merger
and acquisitions (M&A) context, they appear to take the focus of
boards off of operational matters and cause heightened scrutiny of
management primarily with respect to changes of control, when,
as we have recently seen, non-M&A matters such as credit under-
writing and security investment policy standards can have much
greater implications. We need to develop a comparable jurispru-
dence governing oversight of operational matters.
Complicating the process of applying these rules to facilitate
proper governance is the assignment to the plaintiff in cases of
this nature of the burden of proof. That is, if one wishes to pursue
a private claim against corporate officers or directors for breach of
an applicable standard, they must produce some sort of meaning-
ful evidence affirmatively indicating that the breach has occurred
before the defendant must produce its own evidence to rebut the
claim. As the court in Citigroup noted:
The business judgment rule 'is a presumption that in making
a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the
action taken was in the best interests of the company.' The
burden is on the plaintiffs, the party challenging the directors'
decision, to rebut this presumption.47
By definition, requiring a party to satisfy a burden of proof tilts
the process against them by providing for their adversary to win if
neither party is able to present a persuasive case for relief. It is
especially significant here where evidence as to the nature of the
board's discussions is not publicly available at the inception of a
lawsuit, usually not available without costly, time-consuming dis-
44. See Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
45. See Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare, 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).
46. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881, §§ 13(d), 14(d)(1) (codified at
15 u.s.c. §§ 78m(d), 78n(d)(1)).
47. Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 124 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del.
1984)).
46 Vol. 48
Winter 2010Corporate Governance 4
covery, and perhaps totally unavailable as a result of attorney-
client privilege. 48
While all of these standards are useful in the appropriate con-
text, 49 the author argues that they are seriously incomplete in our
current environment because they do not make anyone directly
responsible for an adverse outcome in any context-even one
where there are major societal consequences-so long as they
'jump through the right hoops" of risk disclosure, impartiality and
decisional process. They also have little relevance for "day-to-day"
decisions which, while nominally not having the same implications
as contemplated securities offerings, divestitures, mergers or ac-
quisitions, can have a comparable financial impact. Witness the
decisions by many financial companies to lower their credit un-
derwriting standards, which had such a major role in our eco-
nomic boom and bust. Such decisions do not fit neatly (or at all)
into the major corporate transaction category and may not have
even been considered by relevant BODs, and probably were not
undertaken at any given time for any one organization. However,
the catastrophic impact of these ill-conceived actions is obvious.
The need for improved governance has recently been acknowl-
edged by a blue-ribbon forum of regulators and market partici-
pants convened by the Wall Street Journal to consider the "Future
of Finance." The panel includes a task force discussing systemi-
cally important institutions-so called "too-big-to-fail" firms. One
of the co-chairs of the task force stated the proposition quite suc-
cinctly: "In particular, we came to the view that for those that are
systemically important financial institutions, a very much higher
standard of governance was needed" to prevent failures. 50
IV. WHY DOES THE CURRENT LEGAL REGIMEN NOT ADDRESS
OUTCOMES?
A major reason which has been articulated is that it is essential
to economic development that we encourage risk-taking and inno-
vation by not imposing liability upon anyone when business risks
48. Debra Cassens Weiss, Bank of America to Waive Attorney- Client Privilege in Merrill
Acquisition, A.B.A. J., Oct. 13, 2009,
http://www.abajournal.coni/news/article/bank of~america~to.waive..attorney-
client-.privilege-in -merrill-acquisition.
49. See infra notes 85.90 and accompanying text; Disney, 907 A.2d at 716.
50. Ken Brown, Too Big to Fail, WALL ST. J., December 14, 2009 at R5 (statement of
Ken Costa, Chairman of Lazard International). The highest priority recommendation of
the task force published in a sidebar to the article was, "Hold systemically important insti-
tutions to higher standards of governance." Id.
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or innovations have adverse results. The concern is that if deci-
sion-makers can be embroiled in litigation or suffer personal loss
because a business decision turns out poorly in financial terms,
they will make or authorize only conservative choices that per-
petuate the status quo but do not advance anything for the com-
pany or society.
The Delaware Court of Chancery resoundingly affirmed that
this is the case in its decision in Citigroup:
The Delaware Supreme Court made clear in Stone that direc-
tors of Delaware corporations have certain responsibilities to
implement and monitor a system of oversight; however this
obligation does not eviscerate the core protections of the busi-
ness judgment rule-protections designed to allow corporate
managers and directors to pursue risky transactions without
the specter of being held personally liable if those decisions
turn out poorly. Accordingly, the burden required for a plain-
tiff to rebut the presumption of the business judgment rule by
showing gross negligence is a difficult one . . .. 51
Other related reasons for this deference to the decisions of man-
agement and BODs include a desire to avoid discouraging quali-
fied persons from serving in these capacities 52 and a lack of judi-
cial expertise for the intelligent consideration, let alone second
guessing, of such matters.53
A separate set of considerations, applicable mainly at the fed-
eral level, is a long-standing philosophical choice favoring individ-
ual, especially investor, freedom, so long as the individuals are
properly informed, over governmental dictates as to what is "ap-
propriate" for anyone. Hence, the disclosure-oriented approach of
the federal securities laws.5 4
51. Citigro up, 964 A.2d at 125.
52. Disney, 907 A.2d at 750.
53. Citigro up, 964 A.2d at 126 n.58.
54. Richard Jennings and Harold Marsh stated:
The only standard which must be met in the registration of securities is an adequate
and accurate disclosure of the material facts concerning the company and the securi-
ties it proposes to sell .... Assuming proper disclosure, the Commission cannot deny
registration or otherwise bar the securities from public sale whether or not the price
or other terms of the securities are fair or the issuing company offers reasonable
prospects of success. These are factors which the investor must assess for himself in
the light of the disclosures provided; and if the facts have been fully and correctly
stated, the investor assumes whatever risks may be involved in the purchase of the
securities.
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V. PENDING REFORM PROPOSALS DO NOT ADDRESS THE
UNDERLYING PROBLEM
While there is no shortage of efforts to ultimately obtain better
decisions from systemically important players, none of them di-
rectly address the matter. For example, the Federal Reserve has
sought to address compensation policies for bank55 employees of
every stripe, which it believes encourages excessive risk taking.56
Under the proposal, the Fed could reject any compensation
policies it believes encourage bank employees-from chief ex-
ecutives, to traders, to loan officers-to take too much risk.
Bureaucrats wouldn't set the pay of individuals, but would
review and, if necessary, amend each bank's salary and bonus
policies to make sure they don't create harmful incentives..
Pay is now seen as a factor that could make a firm, and more
broadly the financial system as a whole vulnerable to col-
lapse.57
RICHARD W. JENNINGS & HAROLD MARSH, JR., SECURITIES REGULATIONS 31 (Foundation
Press) (4th ed. 1977).
55. Notably, the proposal has nothing to do with systemically important firms which
are not deemed banks subject to supervision by the Federal Reserve.
56. Damian Paletta & Jon Hilsenrath, Bankers Face Sweeping Curbs on Pay, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 18, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125324292666522101.html. See also
Deborah Solomon et al., U.S. Unveils New Rules on Bankers' Pay, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22,
2009, http://newsstand.umiacs.umd.edu/news/source?url-id=133949574 (pertaining to the
implementation of such proposals).
57. Paletta & Hilsenrath, supra note 56.
The proposal will likely push banks to use 'clawbacks'-provisions to reclaim the pay
of staffers who take risks that hurt their firms-in certain pay packages, among
other tools, to punish employees for taking excessive risks with their firms' money...
* The financial crisis turned up many examples of how pay can give employees incen-
tives to take risks. One example: loan officers who churned out thousands of low
quality loans in order to claim annual bonuses for themselves.
Id. Perhaps these policies can provide these incentives, but there is no evidence that they
have actually done so, and evidence to the contrary. See supra note 15 and accompanying
text. In any event, punishing "perpetrators" after the fact without advising them of this
exposure before the fact does no good for the cause of economic stability. "The Obama ad-
ministration will take a hacksaw to executive compensation at the companies that received
the most federal bailout money." Editors, The Fallout From Big Pay Cuts, N.Y. TIMES,
October 22, 2009, http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/22/the-fallout-from-big-
pay-cuts. The use of such a metaphorical hacksaw (or chainsaw) may satisfy a desire for
social justice, but does nothing to fix the damage resulting from the actions of these firms,
which caused the need for the bailout, We need to ensure that there is proper oversight at
a time when it can avert a loss. For systemically important firms, boards must be incented
49
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New York Attorney General Cuomo shares the belief that regu-
lators can somehow align compensation with the "correct" level of
risk: "Cuomo said he wants to ensure that banks are compensat-
ing employees in a way that doesn't encourage excessive risk-
taking or endanger taxpayers. 'Any attempts to better tie com-
pensation to long-term sustainable growth is a good thing in our
opinion, as opposed to incentives that promote short-term prof-
its ."8
The SEC, backed by President Obama, has joined the fray by
"proposing amendments to the proxy rules under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934" with respect to reporting companies who
"have received financial assistance under the Troubled Asset Re-
lief Program (TARP) to permit a separate shareholder advisory
vote to approve the compensation of executives, as disclosed pur-
suant to the compensation disclosure rules of the Commission" in
the manner contemplated by the TARP legislation. This is an ef-
fort to "enhance the compensation and corporate governance dis-
closures registrants are required to make about their overall com-
pensation policies and their impact on risk taking."5 9
A U.S. Treasury Fact Sheet entitled, "Ensuring Investors Have
a 'Say on Pay,"' "in support of a requirement-also backed by
President Obama-that there be a non-binding shareholder vote
on executive pay for all public companies and not just financial
firms, confidently proclaims, "Say on pay will improve directors'
accountability to the owners of the company . . "60 However,
studies indicate that there is no empirical evidence to support this
statement but that ignorance of pertinent facts pertaining to the
particular company or the marketplace is much more of a factor
than pay formulae.61 An illustration of the confusion around the
to monitor "day-to-day" trading and underwriting to ensure that responsible policies are
being followed. "Clever traders make bets with bidden risks that their bosses don't appre-
ciate until it's too late." David Wessel, Restraining Bankers' Pay: Easy to Promise, Hard to
Do, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19-20, 2009, at A2. This article is intended to advocate policies
which cause boards to ferret out and manage such heretofore "hidden" risk taking.
58. Stevenson Jacobs, NY AG Cuomo asks 8 banks for bonus information, YAHOO!
FINANCE, Jan. 11, 2010, http://finance.yahoo.com/news/NY-AG-Cuomo-asks-8-banks-for-
apf-2974742206.html?x0&.v-6.
59. Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation of TARP Recipients, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-602 18, 74 Fed. Reg. 32474 (proposed July 8, 2009); Proxy Disclosure and
Solicitation Enhancements, Securities Act Release No. 33-9052, Exchange Act Release No.
34-60280, 74 Fed. Reg. 35076 (proposed July 17, 2009).
60. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, FACT SHEET: Administration's Regula-
tory Reform Agenda Moves Forward: Say-On-Pay (July 16, 2009), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg2l9.htm.
61. See supra note 15 and accompanying text; Yermack, supra note 16.
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dichotomy between pay and risk is the comment of House Finan-
cial Service Committee Chairman Barney Frank on a House bill to
facilitate shareholder "say on pay" requirements: "Under this bill,
the question of compensation amounts will now be in the hands of
shareholders and the question of systemic risk will be in the
hands of the government." 62 If compensation amounts do not in-
fluence risk taking, there is no public benefit in regulating such
compensation amounts. If they do have such an influence, then
both matters should be regulated by the same agency.
A critique of the recent efforts to regulate or determine pay
summarizes the fallacy in their rationale:
Q: But what about the argument that systemically impor-
tant firms shouldn't be in risky businesses?
A: Instead of saying that a bank should get out of this or
that business because one individual has a contract that
entitles him to a lot of money, someone should ask
whether this business was too risky or not? Is this busi-
ness the business we really want the bank in? Best I can
tell, in most instances, no one in Washington at least
asked these questions.63
Even better than these questions being asked in Washington,
would be for them to be asked in appropriate boardrooms.
Separately, the SEC purports to address BOD accountability by
"revisit[ing] whether and how the federal proxy rules may be im-
peding the ability of shareholders to exercise the fundamental
right under state law to nominate and elect members to company
boards of directors." As a result of its concern, shared with others,
of "whether boards of directors are truly being held accountable
62. David Cho & Tomoeh Murakami Tse, House Backs Greater Say On Pay by Share-
holders, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dynlcontent/article/2009/07/31/AR2009073102337.html. Notably, Rep. Frank's comments
ignore the role of boards in managing firms. Id.
63. Stephen Grocer, Banking Pay: "Is it Really Risk Management or Just Populist Poli-
tics?," WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2009, http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2009/10/23/banking-pay-is-it-
really-risk-mitigation-or-just-populist-politics (interview with Bob Profusek, head of M&A
practice at Jones Day law firm). It has recently been argued by a renowned authority on
corporate governance-Prof. Jonathan Macey of Yale Law School-that mandating addi-
tional disclosure of executive pay to shareholders or otherwise may actually increase pay
levels by causing embarrassment and adjustment at firms which are paying less than the
relevant average. Jonathan Macey, Washington's Plans May Result in Even Higher Execu-
tive Pay, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2009, at A15.
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for the decisions that they make,"6 4 SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro
"has championed the proxy-access proposal in response to the fi-
nancial crisis, in which critics say corporate boards failed to check
out of control risk taking."65
The SEC's solution is that "[u]nder the proposed rule [Exchange
Act Rule 14a- 11], certain shareholders would be able to include
their nominees for director in the company's proxy materials
unless the shareholders are otherwise prohibited-either by appli-
cable state law or a company's charter/bylaws-from nominating a
candidate for election as a director."66 In a sharp break with prac-
tice, the company would be forced to pay for the inclusion of the
dissident slate on the company's proxy materials, thus encourag-
ing the running of dissident slates.67
This has been described as "the biggest change relating to cor-
porate governance ever proposed by the SEC. Period. It gives ac-
tivists the ultimate vehicle to express dissatisfaction with a board,
the ability to replace board members at the company's expense."68
64. Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Votes to Propose
Rule Amendments to Facilitate Rights of Shareholders to Nominate Directors (May 20,
2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-1 16.htm.
65. See Lynch, supra note 5.
66. Id.
67. "What's magical about this is that it costs [the shareholder] no money, you can
simply nominate someone on a proxy statement and get the shareholders to vote." Creat-
ing a Bigger Mess? Battle Lines Are Drawn on the Proxy Access Rule (Sept. 2, 2009),
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2331 (quoting Wharton School
Professor of Legal Studies and Business Ethics Professor William C. Tyson). The same
source indicates the minimum holding periods and dollar values which would have to be
satisfied for shareholders to include their own slates on company proxy ballots. Id.
68. Jeffrey McCracken & Kara Scannell, Fight Brews as Proxy Access Nears, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 26, 2009, at C1 (quoting John Finley, Esq., partner at Simpson, Thatcher and Bart-
lett). Assuming arguendo that Mr. Finley is correct, this says more about the significance
of prior SEC rules to corporate governance than it does about the impact of this change.
The same sentiments are expressed in a less elegant manner by Nell Minow, a well-known
critic of current corporate governance. Speaking about pay reform she stated: "The only
way you're going to change things is to throw the bums out [referring to corporate direc-
tors]." Joe Nocera, Pay Cuts but Little Headway in what Matters Most, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/23Ibusiness/23nocera.html?-r1-&dbk. The author
believes that the preceding headline embodies better analysis than Ms. Minow's comments.
Pay practice is not what matters most; competent performance is. And after the fact re-
moval from office does little to enhance performance in office.
The Citigroup situation is instructive. As noted in the text, the Delaware courts
have strongly reiterated the absence of legal accountability for the decisions or inaction
that led to its massive losses and government bailout. See supra pp. 42-43. Yet, as this
article goes to press, an effort is being made by two labor unions to remove from Citgroup's
board a director who headed its audit and risk management committees at the relevant
times. '"We're focused on holding a director accountable whose failure to oversee and man-
age risk cost taxpayers hundreds of billions of dollars and brought his firm to the brink of
collapse' said Daniel Pedrotty the director of the AFL-CIO's office of investment." David
Enrich, Two Unions Push for Resignation of Armstrong from Citi's Board, WALL ST. J.,
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This is a non sequitur. The ultimate vehicle for enforcing director
accountability for bad decisions is to increase their personal expo-
sure as a result of such decision. Removing them from a board
while leaving it to shareholders, government, and their successors
to deal with the consequences of such bad decision is, at most, em-
barrassing, and does not align risks and rewards. 69
Directors often are compensated with company stock as well as
fixed amounts of cash. To the extent that stock is a significant
component of their remuneration, all other things being equal,
they have every incentive to take risks to maximize the value of
their stock. Simply increasing the risk of their being removed
from office-in many cases after realizing large financial rewards
from their service from stock sales or otherwise-oes not elimi-
nate this skewed profile.70
Whatever embarrassment may occur from an after-the-fact re-
moval, the director suffers no financial consequences and there is
no direct benefit to shareholders or counterparties from such re-
moval. If the director was too lazy or stupid to recognize the like-
lihood of impending disaster, it seems doubtful that the threat of
January 19, 2010, at C7. The author simply disagrees that removal at this time constitutes
any sort of bona fide accountability when the courts are not permitted to impose any liabil-
ity.
In any event, as permitted by a recently enacted Delaware law, Del. Gen. Corp.L. §
112, several companies have voluntarily adopted by-laws that provide for such shareholder
reimbursement in whole or part. Joann S. Lublin, Fair Fight? Assistance is Offered in
Proxies, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 2009, at Bi.
69. The SEC diluted its message regarding proxy access by adopting in December 2009
"Proxy Disclosure and Solicitation Enhancements" which are intended to enhance the dis-
closure of the effect on a company's risk taking of its compensation policy (at all levels):
We are proposing to amend our [compensation discussion and analysis] requirements
to broaden their scope to include a new section that will provide information about
how the company's overall compensation policies for employees create incentives
that can affect the company's risk and management of that risk . .. . The proposed
amendments would require a company to discuss and analyze its broader compensa-
tion policies for employees generally, including non-executive officers, if risks arising
from those compensation policies or practices may have a material effect on the com-
pany.
Proxy Disclosure and Solicitation Enhancements, Securities Act Release No. 33-9052, Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-60280, 74 Fed. Reg. 35076 (proposed July 17, 2009) (explaining
the rationale for the proposed rule changes). These changes were later adopted. See Proxy
Disclosure Enhancements, Securities Act.Release No. 33-9089, Exchange Act Release No.
34-61175 (December 23, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 239, 240, 249, and 274).
If, as claimed, enhanced proxy access will greatly enhance governance, these new disclo-
sures would seem superfluous. In any event, as disclosures, they have no direct substan-
tive effect on assumption of risk.
70. The risk of removal from their primary position-as opposed to a secondary position
as a director-which befell many executives of troubled financial firms such as Bank of
America, Washington Mutual, (Jitigroup, Wachovia, and Merrill Lynch did not seem to
dissuade officers from excessive risk taking.
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removal once disaster strikes will somehow rectify the laziness or
stupidity in time. It also seems to call upon attenuated logic to
believe that shareholders will recognize poor performance by di-
rectors early enough to prompt them to exercise authority to cause
their removal and timely installation of a new board which will
insist upon a reversal of the ill-founded management policies be-
fore they do serious damage. There is no evidence that the threat
of after-the-fact removal causes sufficient oversight to prevent dis-
aster. The limited empirical evidence on the point indicates that
there appears to be little connection between audit committee in-
dependence prompted by the Sarbanes-Oxley law and avoidance of
earnings restatements. 71
Whatever one thinks about the merits of the pending proposals
for change, they are, at best, an inefficient approach and, at worst,
irrelevant. Regulating pay does not address outcomes; at most, it
addresses one factor in them, and seems based on the simplistic
premise that pay is the only factor prompting risky behavior when
there are many such factors. 72 Prompting additional disclosure of
pay practices and/or nonbinding shareholder votes on them is but
one step further removed from addressing outcomes. Making it
easier to remove poorly performing directors is only an after-the-
fact alternative.
VI. WHY AND WHERE DO WE NEED A CHANGE IN PHILOSOPHY?
For the most part, this author agrees with the rationales for
present law and its preservation. Without a doubt we must en-
courage innovation and individual choice in investments and other
matters. We must also encourage qualified people to serve as cor-
porate officers and directors and to take calculated business risks.
Any new legal regimen must maintain these incentives to the ex-
tent and in the places that they serve their stated purposes.73
71. Anup Agrawal & Sahiba Chadha, Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals,
48 J.L. & EcoN. 371, 375 (2005). While far from conclusive, the studies cited would suggest
that even facilitating the election of totally independent directors through shareholder
proxy access may not improve outcomes in other contexts.
72. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
73. It is time to recognize that a "one-size-fits-all" business judgment rule is no longer
appropriate. Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke acknowledged the need for tailoring
compensation policy to fit individual circumstances: "For most banking organizations, the
use of a single formulaic approach to making employee incentive compensation arrange-
ments appropriately risk-sensitive is likely to provide at least some employees with incen-
tives to take excessive risks." Solomon, supra note 56. Whatever may be the case for cus-
tomizing pay plans, there is at least as strong a case for similar action with respect to legal
frameworks.
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However, the economic meltdown resulted from decisions by a
relative handful of firms, which had little or nothing to do with
innovation or any other behavior which we wish to encourage,
such as technological progress. The author believes that it is time
for a judicious change in the rule reiterated in the Citigroitp case
with respect to entities which are in a position to cause damage to
the broader economy as a result of their own missteps.
Immunizing business decisions from after the fact review by
courts makes perfect sense when we are talking about new prod-
ucts, increased research and development expenditures to bring
them about, refinements of existing products, expansion into new
markets, promotional strategies, and the like. We must protect
business people in all capacities when they consider and decide
upon such matters if the consequences of an ill-founded decision
can be expected to be contained within one entity.
This does not require us to protect the sort of reckless (fre-
quently fraudulent) lending and borrowing, incomprehensible se-
curitization, and aggressive, often fraudulent, accounting by very
large firms that led to so many corporate implosions and collateral
damage during this decade. These practices have nothing to do
with encouraging innovation benefiting consumers or anyone else
in society, service by qualified people or anything else worth en-
couraging.
In far too many cases, it appears that all of this went on either
without the knowledge of BODS7 4 or with their tacit encourage-
ment. For example, with the approval of its BOD, Bank of Amer-
ica in 2007 and 2008 purchased both Countrywide Financial, a
leading originator of low quality loans, and Merrill Lynch, a lead-
ing purchaser of securities comprised of such loans, long after the
dire situations of Countrywide and Merrill had become public
74. These practices occurred both at the corporate level as balance sheets were loaded
with far too much debt, and the individual level as homeowners and buyers obtained sub-
prime and Alt-A mortgages based upon no evidence or fraudulent evidence of income, as-
sets or collateral, often in collusion with lenders and brokers.
WaMu and Wachovia, now part of Wells Fargo helped stoke the housing bubble by is-
suing tens of billions of dollars of so-called option adjustable rate mortgages. Option
ARMs, as they are known, were typically made with little or no documentation and
allowed borrowers to underpay in early years-at the expense of much higher
monthly payments later ... . When the market turned, these loans began defaulting
at a rapid clip, leaving the lender with huge losses.
Colin Barr, WaMu: The forgotten bank failure, CNN MONEY, Sept. 10, 2009,
http://money.cnn.com/2009/09/08/news/economy/wamu.fallout.fortune/index.htm. One
wonders if there was any conscious board decision authorizing such lending practices at
WaMu or elsewhere. No information indicating such consideration has emerged.
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knowledge.75 Similarly, with the encouragement of key members
of Congress, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac stepped up their pur-
chases of low quality loans long after their already precarious fi-
nancial condition had been well documented. 76 At best, actors re-
lied upon the ill-supported judgment of rating agencies, but did
not exercise meaningful judgment of their own.77 We need a stan-
dard that encourages critical thinking instead of herd behavior.
What cries out for legal changes to try to prevent such catastro-
phic outcomes for private firms is the interconnected nature of
today's financial world, both within the U.S. and around the
world. That is, as we saw all too well during 2008 and early 2009,
we can no longer confine the damage from a failed large entity to
its own investors, employees, customers, etc. A failure by a "too
big to fail" entity reverberates around the world economy through
contractual counterparties who may themselves be dragged down
if their trading partner defaults and impairs investor and lender
confidence, which fouls the gears of commerce and brings to a halt
economic activity involving "innocent bystanders." Of course, this
requires inordinately costly 7 8 bailouts and fiscal and monetary
stimuli of the sort which were adopted by Congress, the Federal
Reserve, and the Bush and Obama administrations in efforts to
restart the engines of commerce and prevent total economic col-
lapse and social unrest.
It is simply not possible to confine the effects of poor decision-
making within many large firms to those firms and their direct
constituencies. We must consider external measures to prevent
these problems. Prof. Blinder aptly describes this interconnection,
albeit as part of his contention that compensation practice is to
blame:
75. See Jones, supra note 11; Wallison, supra note 3.
76. See Blinder, supra note 4. The existence of explicit federal policy encouraging re-
duction in lending standards by agencies such as Fannie and Freddie to promote homeown-
ership is well documented by Wallison, supra note 3, and subsequently at Peter J. Wallison,
The Price for Fannie and Freddie Keeps Going Up, WALL ST. J., December 30, 2009, at A17.
"The GSE's had begun buying risky loans in 1993 to meet the 'affordable housing' require-
ments established under congressional direction by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development." Id.
77. "For instance traders who were discouraged from taking big chances with bank
capital instead moved into AAA-rated mortgage bonds that turned out to be more danger.
ous than the ratings implied." Jon Hilsenrath, Plan Aims to Curb Dangerous Risks, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 23, 2009, at A4.
78. Costly in terms of both direct costs, interest on debt incurred to finance them, po-
tential inflation, and contractionary effects of higher taxes to finance them.
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If the costs of foolish compensation schemes remained bottled
up inside firms, they would not be a cause of public policy
concern, although shareholders should still worry. But that is
plainly not the case. Most of the world's financial system col-
lapsed after an orgy of irresponsible risk-taking, and the con-
sequences for the real economy have been devastating.79
In doing so, we must be cognizant of the need to distinguish
bona fide innovation and business risk-taking, which should still
be protected by current standards, from simple reckless or fraudu-
lent behavior, and give the benefit of the doubt to decision-makers
when there is genuine room for disagreement as to which is which.
Professor Hal Scott of the Harvard Law School argues persua-
sively that the extent of interconnectedness is not well known and
probably less than commonly believed, but likely to exist outside
the traditional financial sector where government's "regulation" is
impossible:
If large losses by institutional investors and other stake-
holders are the real reason why we are concerned with inter-
connectedness and "system risk," then we would have to regu-
late all large global corporations, not just financial ones,
whose failures could trigger similar losses-an impossible
task ....
Clearly we need to know far more about the facts of intercon-
nectedness . . .. Congress, as part of its reform legislation,
should mandate the creation of a new expert commission de-
signed to fully investigate the extent and consequences of in-
terconnectedness before any new regulation of systemically
important institutions is actually adopted.80
Since it is BODs which have ultimate responsibility for select-
ing, overseeing, compensating, and dismissing management, we
must assure that there is meaningful oversight by BODs of corpo-
rate management of the most interconnected firms at a time when
debacles can be averted. The objective of encouraging risk-taking
has worked too well in too many very large, interconnected firms.
79. Blinder, supra note 4.
80. Hal Scott, Do We Really Need a Systemic Regulator?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 2009, at
Mi1.
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For firms having the economic significance of Citigroup, the objec-
tive of encouraging risk-taking is no longer entirely appropriate
and must be tempered by an objective of maintaining stability.
We need a legal regimen which forces directors at systemically
important firms to familiarize themselves with what management
is doing, and ask the tough questions of management before poli-
cies are implemented, to see if the downside risk of those policies
is understood (or has been considered at all) and to change course
when even an originally well conceived strategy is no longer suit-
able. Ultimately, we need to force directors to consider on an on-
going basis whether their firms' managements should be in their
positions at all, in order to screen out dishonest, reckless or in-
competent persons.
VII. PROPOSED LEGAL CHANGES
Despite the notable failures which have caused so much recent
dislocation, the existing legal regimen has worked well in most
cases, especially outside the financial sector, and been a major
factor in America's economic growth over many years since World
War II. This author would leave it in place in its entirety for firms
which do not have the potential to cause systemic harm as a result
of their missteps.81 The changes contemplated in this article
should apply only to the largest firms and those in industries-
directly or through affiliates-where their interconnections are
greatest.
These changes should be made at state levels, through legisla-
tion amending the sections of the corporation codes governing di-
rector liability, starting with Delaware and other states of great-
est commercial significance, such as New York, California, and
Illinois. The implementing legislation should make clear that
changes in certificates of incorporation and by-laws may not su-
persede the statutory changes by providing company exculpation
or indemnification for judgments against directors. In the interest
of fairness to directors, the changes should apply only to the con-
sideration of actions occurring after the effective date of the legis-
lation.
It must be emphasized that these changes are only a starting
point for an essential discussion. Specific transactions, time
81. See discussion infra of Disney where the author argues that cases similar to a con-
troversial case involving adjudicated poor performance by directors should continue to be
governed by the current standard and not give rise to BOD liability.
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frames, and amounts should be the subject of extensive commen-
tary from all interested parties, so that their impact on genuine
entrepreneurial activity is kept to a minimum. The important
thing is to begin development of a regimen where there is mean-
ingful accountability at the BOD level for seriously bad decisions
in an environment and of a magnitude which are likely to signifi-
cantly impact the broad economy. The mechanics are much less
important than the principle.
VIII. TRIGGERING EVENTS
In particular, the proposed change in standards would apply to
any company, public or private, which:
* is subject to operational regulation by an federal agency
with jurisdiction over major financial companies (not only
banks) such as the FDIC, U.S. Treasury, Federal Re-
serve or Comptroller of the Currency; or
e has since June 30, 2008, directly, or through an affili-
ate, received any assistance, whether or not repaid, from
any program administered by any agencies, such as
TARP or Term Asset Lending Facility; or
* is not regulated as provided above but has had total
assets exceeding $50 billion at any time during the pre-
ceding eighteen months prior to the date of determination
by a court in the action against the BOD,812 and out-
standing "obligations," broadly defined to include not only
direct obligations but also those arising through vehicles
such as credit default swaps, other derivative contracts
(measured at notional value), special purpose vehicles, or
similar arrangements, exceeding $100 billion at any time
during the preceding 18 months prior to the date of de-
termination by a court.83
As more fully explained below, where an entity meets the pre-
ceding criteria, the Citigroup standard will not apply to actions
alleging breach of a duty of care by BODs. That is, its officers and
82. The author concedes that using the date of determination by a court would lead to a
flexible standard, where a company would be covered by different sets of rules at different
times, but argues that in borderline cases, directors should behave more conservatively.
83. If the special commission suggested by Prof. Scott, see supra page 57, is actually
constituted, its findings should also enter into this analysis.
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directors would not be entitled to the presumption of the business
judgment rule or any similar standard(s) governing review of their
decisions on their merits, and compliance with the pronounce-
ments in Smith v. VanGorkom would not suffice in any civil action
alleging a breach of any duty of care if any of the following events
have occurred during the eighteen months preceding the determi-
nation date by the court:
* Un-dismissed criminal proceedings have been brought
against the entity, any of its affiliates, or its or their ex-
ecutive officers materially involving anything to do with
the entity's business;
* Un-dismissed 84 civil legal proceedings involving in ex-
cess of $50 million have been brought against the entity,
any of its affiliates, or its or their executive officers, if
such proceedings involve an element of willfulness, as
opposed to "mere" negligence;
e The entity or any of its affiliates has filed bankruptcy
or insolvency, or been seized by any regulatory body;
* The entity or any of its affiliates has received any ex-
traordinary governmental assistance85 because of its fi-
nancial condition;
e The entity or any of its affiliates has, during the preced-
ing thirty-six months, cumulatively written down their
assets, taken charges, or established reserves, or been
subject to transactions reflected on their audited financial
statements having a similar effect, in an amount exceed-
ing the greater of $5 billion or 2% of its total assets;86 or
* The entity or any of its affiliates has been subject to
charges reflected on their audited financial statements
reflecting acquisition-related goodwill impairment in an
84. Only an adjudicated dismissal on the merits would count for this purpose; a stipu-
lated dismissal pursuant to a settlement would not be considered a dismissal.
85. FDIC insurance and Federal Reserve discount window borrowing and open market
transactions would be disregarded for this purpose.
86. Write-downs of the sort taken by Washington Mutual, Wachovia, Countrywide and
National City following their acquisitions-$29 billion, $56 billion, $40 billion and $9 bil-
lion, respectively-are indicative of the situations this subsection is intended to cover.
Peter Eavis, Silent Treatment on Bank Write-downs, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2009, at C10.
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amount exceeding the greater of $5 billion or 2% of its to-
tal assets.87
In order to mitigate the impact upon directors of potentially
"stale" claims based upon old events where access to potentially
exculpatory evidence may be difficult, claims under this new stan-
dard would be subject to a short statute of limitations, such as
eighteen months after a claim arises.
IX. LEGAL IMPACT
Where the foregoing criteria are met, the burden of proof in any
action against directors based upon a breach of their duty of care88
would shift to the directors who would be required to respond to
any well pleaded complaint, prior to the presentation of any evi-
dence by the plaintiff, with credible affirmative evidence allowing
the court 89 to determine that a reasonable trier of fact would be
more likely than not to find that they have met their relevant ob-
ligations.90
If the court does not make such a determination, a verdict would
be directed for plaintiffs, with a damages phase to proceed in ac-
cordance with current practice, but subject to a cap of $5- 10 mil-
lion per individual defendant. If the court does make such deter-
mination, then the burden of proof would shift back to the plaintiff
with further proceedings in accordance with present practice, and
the plaintiff would be responsible for all of defendants' legal and
other fees in connection with the initial phase of the litigation.
87. One could credibly argue that large operating losses should be added to this list as
it is a board's job to supervise management such that "good" performance is delivered.
However, the author rejects this view on the basis that operating performance-at least in
the short term-is a function of so many variables that are beyond the reasonable control of
boards (e.g. world and national economic circumstances), that it would be unfair to hold
boards directly responsible. Similarly, legitimate entrepreneurial activity by definition
may give rise to large losses, but as noted, supra, we should not seek to deter such activity.
This would mean, inter alia, that write-downs or write-offs of research and development
costs, or the taking of reserves or provisions in the ordinary course of business (up to some
dollar or percentage threshold), would not trigger any of the special rules described herein.
88. No change is proposed in any action alleging a breach of a duty of loyalty, or with
respect to the standards governing advance of litigation expenses.
89. Perhaps, after expedited discovery.
90. Goldman Sachs has recently added such a standard to its stock-based pay plan for
senior directors with management responsibility: "[Tilhe [stock] holding period includes a
stronger provisions to allow Goldman to take back the shares in cases where the employee
failed to properly account for risk." Joe Bel Bruno, Goldman Sachs Top Execs Get No 2009
Cash Bonus, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20091210-
713039.html.
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In order to maximize directors' oversight efforts where they are
needed, claims under this new standard could not be waived in a
firm's certificate of incorporation under provisions such as Section
102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law. However,
they could be covered by officer/director insurance policies pro-
cured by the firm, so long as such policies have a high deductible
payable by the covered individuals (such as $1 million), one half of
the premiums are paid by the directors, and procurement of such
insurance is approved in advance by shareholders holding at least
60% of the firm's voting equity.
It must be noted that this standard does not make directors
strictly liable for adverse outcomes under any circumstances. No
matter how dire the result, they may still escape liability by af-
firmatively demonstrating that they have properly overseen man-
agement. Without a doubt, this change would cause additional
recovery from directors of affected firms, at least for a time, until
the additional exposure caused an increase in vigilance and a re-
duction in risk taking. The use of the damage cap, short statute of
limitations, liability of unsuccessful plaintiffs for defendants' legal
fees, and the limited authorization of director and officer insur-
ance coverage are efforts to mitigate any excessive risk aversion
which may result from this new standard and thereby avoid a
lending contraction.
In considering whether this is socially desirable, it is essential
to understand where it would not apply. It would not apply to
firms which, although large in absolute terms, do not present high
levels of systemic exposure. The fairly recent Disney case is a
good illustration of where this author believes that present law
need not be changed. This case involved a claim by Disney share-
holders against former officers and directors alleging that the di-
rectors' actions of entering into and performing an employment
agreement and severance contract with a senior executive, Mi-
chael Ovitz, constituted, inter alia, a breach of their duty of care.
Making such a claim superficially appealing is the fact that Mr.
Ovitz received an amount of cash and stock exceeding $100 mil-
lion, despite having worked at Disney for slightly more than one
year and not being recognized as a major contributor to the com-
pany's results during his tenure.91 The court found in favor of the
defendants with respect to all claims, especially the ones involving
the duty of care, despite its disdain for the manner in which the
91. Disney, 907 A.2d at 716.
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situation was handled. The court applied the business judgment
rule, with its strong presumption in favor of director action 92 to
make clear that so long as directors are properly informed and act
in good faith, the "content of the board decision" is not subject to
review, even if it is deemed to be "stupid," "egregious," or "irra-
tional."193 This led the court to determine that while the conduct of
the directors in the consideration of these matters fell far short of
"best practices," it did not breach the duty of care.94
In distinguishing this case from Smith v. Van Gorkom, the court
emphasized that the one involved a sale of the entire company,
while the other did not,95 bolstering the concern that current cor-
porate law to the extent it requires director oversight at all, is ad-
dressed much more to M&A situations than to "day to day" mat-
ters which can have even greater implications.
One can argue persuasively that the director conduct in Disney
cries out for improvement to the same extent as the director con-
duct which contributed to the financial meltdown. While this may
be true, the critical difference is that the extravagant payments to
Mr. Ovitz did not have any material impact beyond the Disney
company. We simply did not see the sort of interconnection be-
tween Disney and anyone else to cause large scale economic fall-
out of the sort we saw in 2008. Disney did not have the kinds of
financial connections to other entities through derivative securi-
ties and the like that magnified the effect of the poor management
in the financial sector and related firms. Indeed, when news of
the Ovitz fiasco became public in 1997, there were no macroeco-
nomic ramifications. Even for Disney, while a nine figure amount
is certainly material, the financial effect was fleeting and did not
bring down the company or give rise to any possibility or specula-
tion that this could happen. Contrast this with the massive eco-
nomic dislocation brought about by the consequences of the bad
risks taken by Citigroup and others like it who are governed by
the same business judgment rule. The rule that makes good sense
in the Disney context is not appropriate in the Citigroup context.
It is time to recognize that our complex, interdependent economy
requires a greater tailoring of legal rules to reflect unique industry
circumstances than the economy of ten or twenty years ago.
92. Id. at 746-47.
93. Id. at 750.
94. Id. at 697. "fMany aspects of defendants' conduct ... fell significantly short of the
best practices of ideal corporate governance." Id.
95. Id. at 767.
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This suggests that for most firms, even very large firms, the
traditional business judgment rule, which has clearly contributed
to much desirable entrepreneurial activity, is still justified. This
is especially the case today, where job creation is a key social pri-
ority, such that we want to encourage business risk-taking where
the consequences of such risks can be confined to the firm taking
them. As the Disney court noted:
The redress for failures that arise from faithful management
must come from the markets, through the action of share-
holders and the free flow of capital, and not from this Court.
Should the Court apportion liability based upon the ultimate
outcome of decisions taken in good faith by faithful directors
or officers, those decision-makers would necessarily take deci-
sions that minimize risk, not maximize value.96
While this approach of disregarding outcomes for all firms made
perfect sense in 2005 and for the most part still makes sense to-
day, what we have learned about the interconnections of some
firms requires some modification. We simply cannot allow every
firm to engage in unrestrained risk-taking, with only the market-
place to sit in judgment, when bad outcomes of such risk-taking
have such widespread collateral damage to persons who were in
no position to evaluate (let alone mitigate) the significance to them
of such risk-taking as is the case with persons investing directly in
a firm pursuing aggressive practices.
A good deal of deliberation is required before any change of this
magnitude is implemented anywhere, in order to minimize any
unwarranted contraction of financing or other business activity.
There is no doubt that the initial reaction in many corporate
boardrooms will be an emphasis on conservatism in lending, in-
vesting and hiring decisions. Former Federal Reserve Board
Chairman and current Obama Administration advisor Paul Vol-
cker advocates a significant reduction in the risks assumed by
commercial banks in order to maintain the stability of the finan-
cial system: "Extensive participation in the impersonal, transac-
tion oriented capital market does not seem to me an intrinsic part
of commercial banking."97 The comments reflect Mr. Volcker's
long held view that banks should act more in line with their tradi-
96. Disney, 907 A.2d at 698.
97. Damian Paletta & John R. Emshwiller, Volcker Calls for Restricting Banks' Risk,
Tr-ading Activity, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2009, at A2.
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tional role and not take extremely risky gambles, which could
threaten the viability of commercial banks and expose the Federal
Reserve and taxpayers to large risks. It may be politically impos-
sible and perhaps economically premature to implement these
sorts of draconian restraints suggested by Mr. Volcker on the ac-
tivities of banks or other large firms.98 Even if this is true, it still
militates in favor of much greater oversight of the trading activity
which does occur.
One would expect any tendency toward excessive risk aversion
to be fairly promptly mitigated as a result of natural competition
for profitable business opportunities and the realization that the
changes are applicable to only a relatively small portion of firms.
Furthermore, one would also expect the legal changes to prompt
an increased emphasis on diversification of risks to reduce the
likelihood of problems from one "bad bet."
Given the author's belief that any unintended risk aversion
would be temporary, he believes that it is well worth it in order to
substantially reduce the likelihood of a handful of firms bringing
us to (or beyond) the brink of ruin as a result of their unbridled
risk taking. We have reached a point in our economic develop-
ment where we need to revisit our premise that risk is always de-
sirable in itself, and strive for standards which directly encourage
private entities, especially those with the highest level of inter-
connection to the rest of the economy, to properly evaluate risks.
Rather than dance around the issue with mechanisms which at
best indirectly affect the appetite for risk such as regulating com-
pensation or identity of directors, it is more logical to address di-
rectly risk-taking by imposing some consequences when such risks
turn out to be ill-founded. While the specific parameters of those
consequences should be the subject of much discussion among the
bench, bar, and commentators before any change is made, it is
clear that we must have a fundamental re-examination of the
business judgment rule in order to shield our economy from what
it has wrought when indiscriminately applied.
While the action proposed in this article may seem drastic, so
too are the economic circumstances which prompted its considera-
tion. As Lewis Carroll's Walrus has said, the time has come to
talk of many things-even those which seemed unspeakable in
another era.
98. Id.
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